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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
According to the record before this Court, Appellant 
was not aware of the impediment to the marriage until after the 
Decree of Divorce was entered. Therefore Appellant raised his 
jurisdictional defense as soon as he had knowledge of the 
defense. 
Appellee cites two cases to refute Appellantfs defense 
of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The first case is a 
Kansas case which appears to address in personam jurisdiction 
rather than subject matter jurisdiction. Clearly once a person 
accepts in personam jurisdiction of the court, they cannot 
later object to in personam jurisdiction. However, subject 
matter jurisdiction is another matter. 
The second case cited by Appellee is a Utah case which 
clearly states that the Court has no jurisdiction over the 
subject matter in a case such as this. Appellee cites the case 
because the Court went on to overlook the jurisdictional 
problem due to fraud. In the case before the Court, there is 
no fraud and therefore there is no jurisdiction over the 
subject matter. 
The Court did abuse its discretion in its Findings that 
Appellant was aware of the impediment prior to the Decree of 
Divorce. The only record before the Court is the Affidavit of 
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Plaintiff that states at the time of the Affidavit, he had only 
recently become aware of the impediment. The standard of 
review of this Court is that it will presume the trial Court 
used appropriate discretion unless the record clearly shows to 
the contrary. In this case, the record clearly shows to the 
contrary. 
Appellee has misapplied the standard of review for a 
Motion for New Trial which requires a showing of manifest abuse 
of discretion. That standard of review is not appropriate in 
this case as there has not been a Motion for a New Trial. 
ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT HAS NOT WAIVED HIS DEFENSE OF LACK OF 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
According to the only record before the court, 
Plaintiff's Affidavit, Appellant was not aware of the 
impediment to the marriage until after the Decree of Divorce. 
That being the case, Appellant was unable to assert his 
jurisdictional defense until he became aware of the impediment. 
Appellee cites two cases in support of her position 
that Appellant is estopped from asserting the defense of lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction. The first case cited Rinehart 
v. Rinehart, 83 P.2d 628 (Kansas 1938) appears to be a case 
where the court is addressing in personam jurisdiction rather 
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than subject matter jurisdiction. Essentially the argument is 
that once the individual has accepted jurisdiction of the court 
the party is then estopped from denying such jurisdiction. 
Further, her arguments regarding the application of the statute 
do not apply in this case. All of this seems to indicate that 
the jurisdiction spoken of in Rhinehart is in personam 
jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction. 
The second case referred to by Appellee is the same 
case which Appellant cites in support of his position. In 
Caffal v. Caffal. 5 Utah 2d 407, 303 P.2d 386 (1956) the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly stated there was no subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear a divorce when there was not a valid 
marriage. However, Appellee cites the portion of the case 
which indicates that if the party is aware of the impediment 
at the time of filing for divorce, then the party is estopped 
from alleging lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The situation in Caffal was that of fraud. The husband 
was aware of the impediment and never informed the court of the 
impediment at the time of the divorce action. Furthermore, 
there was about a two-year period before any action was taken 
to attempt to set aside the divorce. The fraud aspects of 
Caffal are not present in the case before the court. Simply 
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put, Appellant believes Caffal supports his proposition that 
there is no subject matter jurisdiction. 
Appellant asks the court to apply practical reasoning 
to this case. Had Appellant known about the impediment, he 
certainly would have disclosed that information to his 
attorney, and his attorney would have advised him that an 
annulment would have been in his best interest where he did not 
wish to pay alimony. Consequently, Appellant would have 
pursued a Decree of Annulment in the first place rather than 
waiting, unless, as is his testimony, Appellant was not aware 
of the impediment until after the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. This is the same factual pattern as Jones v. Jones, 
161 So. 836 (Fla. 1935). In Jones, the court felt that the 
marriage was voidable rather than void because there was a 
presumptively valid common law marriage after the removal of 
the impediment. However, the court still felt that the 
marriage was voidable because the parties seeking to set aside 
the marriage entered a Decree of Annulment with an innocent 
party not being made aware of the impediment until after the 
Decree of Divorce. Likewise, Appellant is an innocent party 
and should not be penalized for what he was not made aware of 
prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. 
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It is difficult to imagine that Appellant should be 
estopped from asserting a defense he was not aware was 
applicable at the time of the original divorce action. 
Therefore, in light of Caffal and in light of the evidence 
before the court, Appellant asks this court to find that the 
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter a 
Decree of Divorce. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID ABUSE ITS DISCRETION ON ITS 
FINDINGS OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DECREE 
Appellant is frankly confused by Appellee's argument 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its 
findings or its entry of a Decree of Divorce. The findings 
and entry of the divorce are not at issue on appeal to 
Appellant's knowledge, however the findings of the court 
regarding Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Decree are at 
issue. Appellee correctly cites Donohue v. Int. Health Care, 
Inc. , 748 P. 2d 1067, 68 (Utah 1987) that the standard of review 
is that the higher court will presume the court used 
appropriate discretion unless the record clearly shows to the 
contrary. Of course, Appellant's argument is that the only 
record before the court .is directly contrary to the court's 
findings regarding the Motion to Set Aside Decree of Divorce. 
-6-
Appellee states that there was testimony heard by the 
trial judge on November 9, 1989, at the time of the actual 
divorce hearing. However, there is no record before the court 
to clarify what that testimony was. Appellant is doubtful that 
at the time of the divorce hearing, any testimony was offered 
that both parties were aware of the impediment to the marriage 
at the time the marriage was entered into. If that testimony 
had been offered, it would seem that the trial court would have 
taken exception to that testimony. Nevertheless, Appellee has 
waived any arguments which that testimony may have presented 
to that court by not producing the record. (See Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, Rule 11). 
Appellee also cites Amos v. Bennion, 517 P. 2d 1008. 
Appellee quotes Amos as saying that a "ruling . . . will not 
be disturbed on appeal except when there is a clear and 
manifest abuse of discretion." When in fact it stated a 
"ruling on a Motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on 
appeal except . . . abuse of discretion." Id at 1010. 
Appellant feels that Amos has been misquoted in this particular 
instance or at least mis-applied. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee has narrowed the scope of appeal by conceding 
in her brief that there is no issue of common law marriage. 
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Consequently the issues to be decided by this court all revolve 
around the ability of the trial court enter a Decree of Divorce 
on a marriage which is void ab initio. Appellant asks this 
court to find that the trial court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter a Decree of Divorce that the trial court 
erred in assuming a void ab initio marriage must have a Decree 
declaring it void in order to be void, that the trial court 
erred in not declaring the Decree of Divorce void, thus the 
trial court erred in finding that both parties were aware of 
the existence of the impediment and that the trial court abused 
its discretion in not granting the motion to Set Aside the 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
< i 
DATED this 3J"" day of March, 1991. 
JEAN ROBERT BABILIS & ASSOCIATES 
Randall Lee Marshall 
Attorney for Appellant 
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